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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
URIEL CHAVEZ-ESPINOZA, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
vs. ] 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Defendant/Appellee. ] 
I BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
) Case No. 20061090 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction from this appeal based upon the filing 
of a Notice of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the imposition of the sentence in a 
criminal felony case and based upon Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
from a final sentence imposed after a trial. 
PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS 
There are no prior or related appeals by this Appellant or any person. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW THE STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
AND CITATIONS 
1. THE VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY AS TO COUNT 7 IS INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE AGGRAVATED BURGLARY CONVICTION AND A NEW TRIAL 
SHOULD BE ORDERED. 
Standard of review: When reviewing a jury verdict, the Court examines the 
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evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the verdict. State v. 
Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996). 
Citation to Record: See Verdict Form (Record 154 to 1580) set forth in 
Addendum. 
2. THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF A FIRST DEGREE FELONY WAS 
BASED UPON JURY INSTRUCTIONS THAT DID NOT ADEQUATELY DEFINE 
THE FIRST DEGREE FELONY OFFENSE AND FAILED TO INSTRUCT OF 
SPECIFIC INTENT. 
Standard of review: The court reviews jury instructions under a correctness 
standard, granting no particular deference to the trial court. State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 
352, 354 (Utah Ct.App. 1995), cert, denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). The court reviews 
jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, 
fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." Laws v. Standing City, 893 P.2d 1083, 
1084 (Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). "However, jury instructions 
to which a party failed to object at trial will not be reviewed absent a showing of manifest 
injustice." Gibson, 908 P.2d at 354. 
Citation to Record: Instructions given are set forth in items 1 through 9 of 
Addendum to this Brief. 
3. THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY WAS NOT PREPARED FOR 
TRIAL AND DID NOT MEET THE STANDARDS REQUIRED FOR EFFECTIVE 
COUNSEL. 
Standard of review: The Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
raised for the first time on appeal for correctness. State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292,13 
P.3d 604 (Utah App 2002) 
Citation to Record: The Defendant, on November 29, 2006, filed a hand written 
note from the Utah State prison indicating and questioning the effectiveness of his 
assistance of counsel. (See Record, pg 198) 
4. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE FIRST DEGREE FELONY TO 
BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION 
TO DISMISS. 
Standard of review: An appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions of law 
for correctness because "a single trial judge is in an inferior position to determine what 
the legal content of [a legal concept] should be [whereas] a panel of appellate judges, 
with their collective experience and their broader perspective, is better suited to that task. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 
Citation to Record: Motion (Transcript of Trial, Vol. Ill, pg. 64) 
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5. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A VERDICT OF A FIRST 
DEGREE FELONY. 
Standard of review: In reviewing a jury verdict, the Court views the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. State 
v. Andrews, 843 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 19952). 
Citation to Record: Facts set forth in detail in Addendum. 
6. THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING JURORS FOR CAUSE OVER 
OBJECTION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL AND IN GRANTING OBJECTION BY THE 
STATE. 
Standard of review: The Utah Supreme Court has noted, however, that the exercise 
of the trial court's discretion in selecting a fair and impartial jury must be viewed "in light 
of the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the 
prospective juror and selecting another." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981). 
Citation to Record: Transcript of Trial: Vol. I, pg. 132-138. 
7. THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR JURY PANEL CONTAINING 
HISPANIC PERSONS. 
Standard of review: The Utah Supreme Court has noted, however, that the exercise 
of the trial court's discretion in selecting a fair and impartial jury must be viewed "in light 
of the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the 
prospective juror and selecting another." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981). 
Citation to Record: Transcript of Trial: Vol. I, pg. 138 (See Jury List set forth in 
Addendum, pg. 19.) 
8. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A MISTRIAL BASED UPON 
STATEMENTS MADE ABOUT INADMISSIBLE DEATH THREATS HEARD BY 
THE JURY. 
Standard of review: Because a district judge is in an advantaged position to 
determine the impact of the courtroom events on the total proceedings, once a district 
court has exercised its discretion and denied a motion for a mistrial, we will not reverse 
the court's decision unless it "is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the 
jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial." State v. Wach, 24 P.3d 
948 (Utah 2001) 
Citation to Record: Transcript of Trial: Vol. II, pg. 127-128 
9. THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL SHOULD BE 
REMANDED FOR FURTHER HEARING. 
Standard of review: When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim "is raised for 
the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a question of law." 
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State v. Holbert, 61 P.3d 291 (2002) 
Citation to Record: See facts set forth in detail in Addendum which include points 
as to ineffective counsel. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, & ORDINANCES 
Utah Code Annotated 76-3-203.1. Offenses committed in concert with two or 
more persons — Notice — Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject to an 
enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) if the trier of fact 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two or more persons. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the 
defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing 
the offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, and each of the 
other persons: 
(i) was physically present; or 
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4). 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii): 
(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to engage in the 
same offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and 
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a party if he 
were an adult. 
(2) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall cause 
to be subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
(3) The enhanced penalty for a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony; 
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and 
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than nine years 
and which may be for life. 
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that the 
persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, 
apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged with 
or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
Based on a Felony Criminal Information the Appellant was convicted in the Fourth 
District Court, Wasatch County by the jury verdict of Aggravated Burglary with a jury 
finding that he acted in concert with two or more persons. Mr. Chavez-Espinoza was 
found Guilty of Aggravated Assault with the finding that he acted in concert with two or 
more persons as set forth in Count Three and was convicted of Assault of Fiorina Chavez 
under Count Four with the finding that he acted in concert with two or more persons. The 
Appellant was found Guilty of Assault as to Jose Luis Ramirez with the finding that he 
did not act in concert with two or more persons and was found Guilty of Assault as to 
Jorge Ramirez with the finding that he acted in concert with two or more persons. He 
was found Not Guilty of Assault as to Rosa Solis. The Appellant was sentenced to a term 
of Nine years to life on Count One with other counts to run concurrently and he is in 
prison based only on this conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND TESTIMONY AT TRIAL 
Summary of Testimony from Trial Transcript 
Volume I, Record Pg» 204 
1. The jury trial commenced on September 18, 2006 and prior to the trial, the 
Court made record of a pre-trial Motion to Continue filed by defense counsel that was 
addressed on September 13, 2006 during a telephone conference. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. I, 
Pg6) 
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2. During the Prosecutor's opening statement he indicated to the jury that "this is a 
culture we are not used to seeing everyday" and no objection was made by defense 
counsel. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. I, pg 159) 
Summary of Testimony from Trial Transcript 
Volume II, Record Pg. 205 
3. Adrian Ramirez, 17 years of age, testified that he met Jorge Urias through Uriel 
Chavez-Espinoza and that he had purchased cocaine from Jorge Urias on or about 
December 24, 2005 which he gave to Jose Luis. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 15) 
4. Adrian Ramirez stated that on New Year's Eve, January 1, 2006, there was a 
party at his family's apartment in Todd Hollow, Heber City, State of Utah and on that 
morning Uriel Chavez-Espinoza told Adrian Ramirez during a telephone conversation to 
come to Park City so that he could fight him and his brother. He claimed Uriel stated that 
he would come to where he was at. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 22) 
5. Mr. Ramirez said that he went back to his bed to go to sleep but was later 
awoken by a knock at the front door and when he opened the door he was immediately hit 
by Uriel Chavez-Espinoza who was standing outside the door. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, 
Pg26) 
6. Adrian Ramirez testified that the person known as La Borrega pulled him 
outside the residence where he was hit about seven times and Adrian also hit Uriel in the 
face. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 27-28) According to his testimony, the other people 
present with Uriel as follows: 
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"It was Uriel, La Diabla, Angel, La Borrega." (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 29) 
7. Adrian Ramirez indicated that his brother and Jose Luis came out of the 
residence and began fighting with the others in the hallway when his mother told them to 
"keep running further down". (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 31) He stated that after 
fighting in the hallway he left the area of the building and was hiding under a truck where 
Uriel found him, the other persons arrived, grabbed Adrian and started to hit him where 
he received cuts on his neck and face. (Trans, of Trial: Volume II, pg 37) Adrian 
Ramirez claimed that Uriel sat on his chest and was holding him down when Uriel said, 
"You're going to die, dog." (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 38) He did not see any knife, 
only hearing Uriel ask, "Hand me the knife." (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 39) 
8. The witness said he had been kicked in the ribs and that he was sore for about 
one month based on those injuries. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 55) At the end of the 
examination, Adrian Ramirez testified as follows: 
Q: Okay. Now, besides the fact that you had returned some cocaine to 
Jorge Urias for a refund - or Jose Luis did, do you know of any other 
reason why Uriel would have been mad at you? 
A: I don't know. It might have been his. 
(Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 60) 
9. On cross-examination, Adrian Ramirez denied having any items in his hand 
such as a beer bottle when he answered the door. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 73) He 
admitted that he did not tell anyone he was hiding under a truck at the last hearing before 
trial. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 88) When asked about his testimony at the preliminary 
hearing, Mr. Poston indicated that Adrian Ramirez never mentioned anything about a 
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truck. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 88) The witness claimed he was cut on the head when 
Uriel threw him on the snow, but he admitted that he did not see Uriel cut him with the 
knife. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 91) 
10. Jorge Ramirez, the brother of the witness Adrian Ramirez, testified that on 
January 1, 2006 he received a telephone call from the Appellant, Uriel Chavez-Espinoza. 
(Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 98) He indicated that the Uriel Chavez-Espinoza wanted him 
to go to a bar where he was drinking in order to fight. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 100) 
He stayed and observed Adrian Ramirez go to the front door and he heard screaming back 
and forth. He stated, "All of them were screaming." (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 103) 
11. Jorge Ramirez claimed that he observed the Appellant and the other persons, 
Angel and La Diabla, inside the residence and they were fighting with Adrian. The 
witness testified that after the problem was over he went inside the residence and there 
was a hole in the wall. (Trans, of Trial: Vol.11, pg 105) The witness indicated that he 
was covering his face during the incident and he stated to Mr. Low concerning the hole in 
the wall as follows: 
A: I think it was a kick because it's about this far up from - in the wall, 
and it could not be a fist because you could not reach all that way to 
hit the wall. 
Q: Okay. But, again, you were the one standing by the wall when it got 
the hole in it? 
A: Yes. (Trans, of Trial: Vol.11, pg 105) 
12. Jorge Ramirez testified that he was cut on his arm by "Angel", with a bottle 
and he saw Jorge with a switchblade knife when Uriel was yelling and threatening that he 
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was going to kill him. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 117) 
13. He indicated that after the door to the apartment was closed, Adrian wasn't 
present in the residence and the Police were called. The witness, his sister, and Luis went 
outside and found Adrien who had fainted. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 119) 
14. On cross-examination, the witness indicated that Uriel Chavez-Espinoza had 
never touched him, it was only Angel. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 129) 
15. The Prosecutor asked him if he was involved in the purchase of cocaine from 
Jorge Urias and the witness answered, "Yes". (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 135) At that 
time the Court admonished the witness concerning his Fifth Amendment privilege not to 
incriminate himself and after a discussion with the Court about consulting with an 
attorney and about possible immunity, the witness left the stand to be re-called at a later 
time. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 138) 
16. Fiorina Chavez, Adrian and Jorge Ramirez's mother, said that Uriel Chavez-
Espinoza was her nephew. She stated on January 1, 2006, her sons and nephew were 
fighting and Jose Luis was covered in blood. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 143) She told 
Uriel to stop fighting and "just go home" but he never answered her. She said that when 
she turned around to look at her son, Jorge who was fighting with Angel, Angel hit her in 
the face. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 144) She testified that Uriel was saying that he was 
going "to kill us all, that it didn't matter that we were his family". (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, 
pg 147) 
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17. The witness stated that after the door to the apartment was closed after 
everyone left the hallway they discovered that Adrian was not present and that the family 
left the apartment to look for Adrian. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 149) 
18. On cross-examination, Fiorina Chavez testified that her husband had 
purchased a six-pack of beer and that her sons were drinking beer that evening. (Trans, 
of Trial: Vol. II, pg 152) She stated that Uriel stopped fighting with Jose Luis, "but this 
other guy, La Borrega, he continued" and that she never heard Uriel tell Angel to hit her 
or touch her. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 155) 
19. Ruben Ramirez, the husband of Fiorina Chavez, testified that when he awoke 
that night there was a fight outside the front door of his apartment, he went out to the 
hallway, and he was able to get his family back inside the house. La Borrega had a 
pocket knife which he had pointed toward Mr. Ramirez's belly as the Ramirez family was 
backing away. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 161) 
20. Ruben Ramirez testified during cross-examination that his wife went outside 
the apartment before he did, and was asking Jose Luis and Uriel Chavez to stop fighting. 
When Ruben Ramirez got in the middle of the two, the fight stopped. (Trans, of Trial: 
Vol. II, pg 164) He said that he saw Jorge fighting and went to help him because there 
were three of them fighting with La Diabla, and Uriel hit him with a bottle and he 
received four stitches in his head. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 192) 
Summary of Testimony from Trial Transcript 
Volume III, Record Page 206 
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21. Deputy Travus Jensen of the Wasatch County Sheriffs Department testified 
that on January 26, 2006 he interviewed the Appellant, Uriel Chavez-Espinoza, and his 
attorney Scott Poston. Uriel stated on the evening in question that he and Jorge Ramirez 
where challenging each other back and forth to come over to each other's house. (Trans. 
ofTrial:Vol.III,pg37) 
22. The Prosecution then asked the following question without objection: 
Q: And what did he say about Angel, as far as what he knew about 
Angel? 
A: He said he knew a little about him. I believe he said he had been to 
his house before but didn't know his mas well, but did know of him. 
Q: Did he say whether he thought Angel was involved in gangs? 
A: He did say that he - - he thinks he is. 
(Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 40-41) 
23. The Deputy indicated that the Appellant told him that his intent on going to the 
apartment in Todd Hollow that night was to "fix the problem" with his cousins. (Trans, of 
Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 41) The Deputy stated that the Appellant told him that during the fight 
he had received some bumps and was sore on his back although he didn't receive any cuts 
or bruises. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 45) The Deputy indicated that Mr. Uriel Chavez-
Espinoza came in to talk with him voluntarily and discussed matters for an hour and a half 
(Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 49) 
24. At trial, the Wasatch County Deputy was shown Exhibit 36, a picture of Jorge 
Urias, and he indicated that Mr. Urias appeared to have an injury to his face caused by a 
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bottle or a knife. Deputy Jensen also indicated that he received information that the person 
known as "La Diabla" received a cut to the hand and it was a deep cut. (Trans, of Trial: 
Vol. Ill, pg 52) After the testimony of Deputy Jensen, the State rested. (Trans, of Trial: 
Vol. Ill, pg 57) 
25. The defense re-called Adrian Ramirez to the stand and examined him regarding 
prior testimony from a preliminary hearing and was asked about earlier testimony in which 
he stated that he had never talked to Uriel Chavez-Espinoza on the night in question. Mr. 
Ramirez indicated that he meant to say that talking on the phone was not the same as 
speaking face to face with a person. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 66) 
26. The defense then re-called Jorge Ramirez to the stand concerning his testimony 
that Uriel Chavez-Espinoza called him early in the morning on January 1, 2006. He 
admitted that at the preliminary hearing he testified that he had never talked to the 
Appellant. Jorge testified that earlier in the day on the 31st of December, 2005, he stopped 
to talk to Uriel who was helping the person known as La Borrega move from the Aspens 
in Park City to Todd Hollow Apartments in Heber City. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 74) 
27. Veratania Nava testified that she lived with her sister and Uriel Chavez-
Espinoza and that in March of 2006, Jorge Ramirez came to her house. She indicated that 
Jorge Ramirez was talking to her sister Carmen and holding Carmen and Uriel's baby 
inside the residence. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 81) 
28. On cross-examination Ms. Nava was asked by the State if she was aware 
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whether or not Uriel sold cocaine. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 84) At this time, an 
objection was made by defense counsel and after a ruling by the Court off the record, she 
testified that Uriel did not sell cocaine. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 113) 
29. Cecilio Chavez testified that he knew Adrian Ramirez and Jorge Ramirez, his 
cousins, and he testified that two or three months prior to the trial - after the incident and 
before trial, that he had been present with Jorge Ramirez and the Appellant in Park City, 
Utah. On a different occasion Mr. Chavez had also been present with Adrian Ramirez and 
the Appellant in Heber, Utah. He testified that on one occasion, Adrian Ramirez and Uriel 
Chavez-Espinoza came to a barbecue together. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 117) 
30. During Mr. Low's cross-examination of this witness concerning the reasons 
why there may have been such contact between the Appellant and alleged victims, the 
following exchange took place: 
Q: Okay. All right. Now, are you aware of any of the demands that the 
State has made, someone from my office, or the police officers, on 
Adrian and on Jorge to continue their involvement in this case and to 
do whatever they may need to do to participate in this case? 
A: I'm sorry. 
Q: Are you aware of any of the stresses and demands that - -
A: No. 
(Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 120-121) 
31. Adrian Janette Chavez testified that she also saw Adrian Ramirez, Jorge 
Ramirez, and Uriel Chavez-Espinoza together after the incident on January 1, 2006. 
(Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 125) 
32. Arturo Moreno stated that he was friends with Adrian Ramirez and Jorge 
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Ramirez and was at Rosa's apartment on December 31, 2005 because Rosa's niece was 
his girlfriend at the time. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 127) 
33. He indicated that he had a good view of the front door and that Jorge left 
about 3:00 a.m. and returned at about 4:30 a.m. or 5:00 a.m. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 
129) Mr. Moreno testified that Jorge and Rosa left the apartment after Jorge returned, but 
that Rosa had not left the apartment prior to that. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 130) 
34. Arturo Moreno testified that he was with La Diabla the next morning and saw 
that he had a deep wound or cut on his hand that was about 2 lA to 3 inches long. (Trans. 
ofTrial:Vol.III,pgl31) 
35. Eden Guadalupe Chavez, the sister of the Appellant, said that she saw Adrian 
Ramirez with Uriel Chavez-Espinoza at the 7-11 in Heber during the month of January, 
2006 and they were drinking together and getting along. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 
145) 
36. The next witness, Carmen Nava, testified she was the girlfriend of the 
Appellant and that they had a child together. Between March and April of that year, 
Jorge Ramirez came over to her house and was holding her baby while he was visiting 
and talking with Uriel. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 150) 
37. Edgar Ivan Perez testified as a defense witness that he worked next to the 
Appellant, with Uriel Chavez-Espinoza working at Albertsons and at the witness working 
at Burger King in Park City, and that he sees Uriel almost every day. (Trans, of Trial: 
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Vol. Ill, pg 160) He testified that in the month of August he saw Adrian Ramirez and 
Jorge Ramirez with Uriel Chavez-Espinoza and that the three of them were drinking in 
the parking lot of the Todd Hollow apartments. At that time, he heard them talking about 
the incident of January 1, 2006 and Mr. Perez testified that the men told him that Uriel 
didn't cut Adrian but it was La Diabla that had cut Adrian. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 
164) 
38. The Appellant took the stand and testified that on the night of December 31, 
2005 or the morning of January 1, 2006 he was at a dinner of a friend who was having a 
birthday party where Miguel and La Diabla were present. He indicated that he met his 
friend, Jorge Urias, and there was some discussion about his cousin, Jorge Ramirez. The 
Appellant testified that Jorge Urias indicated that Jorge Ramirez wanted to "hit him 
[Jorge Urias]" because the drugs were no good, and Uriel wanted to fix the problem 
between his cousin and his friend. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 175) He indicated that 
his friend, Jorge Urias, told him that his cousins were mad because of the bad drugs he 
had sold to them and then Uriel's friend, Jorge Urias, passed him the telephone after he 
had been talking with his cousin, Jorge Ramirez, for some time. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. 
HI, pg 176) 
39. The Appellant indicated that Jorge Ramirez was not happy that he was trying 
to be a mediator and his cousin, Mr. Ramirez, used curse words during the telephone call. 
(Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 176) The Appellant testified that he told his cousin he was 
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going to come over to straighten out the situation and his cousin, Jorge Ramirez, hung up 
the telephone. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 178) 
40. Uriel Chavez-Espinoza said that he left the party and while leaving Miguel 
asked where he was going. Uriel told him they were going to Todd Hollow and Miguel 
said he would go with him because he had just moved into that apartment complex. 
(Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 180) 
41. Mr. Chavez-Espinoza indicated that they all drove to Heber City from Park 
City and that he knocked on the door of the apartment. Adrian Ramirez came out of the 
door of the apartment and the Appellant stated that when he indicated to Adrian Ramirez, 
"What's up, man? Here I am." he was then pushed by Adrian Ramirez. (Trans, of Trial: 
Vol. Ill, pg 183) The Appellant indicated that he did not bring his friends along to beat 
anyone up but they just came along with him to the apartment. He indicated that the 
persons who came out of the apartment had glasses and bottles and they were throwing 
the bottles. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 191) 
42. Uriel Chavez-Espinoza testified that he did not see La Diabla until the next 
day when he got a call from his friend, Miguel, who lived at the Todd Hollow apartment 
complex. Miguel indicated that La Diabla was looking for Uriel because he wanted to 
leave and that he was wounded. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 191) 
43. At that time, La Diabla got back into the car and was bleeding from his 
wound. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 192) Uriel said that he never told his friends to take 
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any physical action against his cousins and that he believed his friends were merely 
defending him at the time. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 192) 
44. On cross-examination the following exchange took place between the 
Prosecutor, Mr. Low and the Appellant, Uriel Chavez-Espinoza: 
Q: So somehow now this was a dispute between you and Jorge 
Ramirez? 
A: Well, kind of. We did have an argument. We did cross swear 
words. We were speaking harshly to each other. 
Q: Now, you tole Deputy Jensen that you were the one that told Jorge 
Urias to go with you over to Todd Hollow? 
A: That is correct. I said let's go, let's go talk to - and fix things with 
your cousins. 
Q: And the word that you used with Deputy Jensen was that you were 
going to "fix" the problem? 
A: Yes. 
(Trans, of Trial: Vol. Ill, pg 199-200) 
Summary of Testimony from Trial Transcript 
Sentencing, Record Page 206 
45. The matter came for sentencing on November 17, 2006. (Trans, of Sentencing 
R. 97 pg. 2) At the sentencing, trial counsel for Mr. Chavez-Espinoza noted that Adult 
Parole and Probation recommended Probation and 365 days incarceration as a condition 
of probation in the county jail. (Trans, of Sentencing R. 97 pg. 3) 
46. The Appellant's girlfriend, Carmen Nava, was allowed to testify and indicated 
that the Appellant had a child and it was important that the child be able to visit his father. 
(Trans, of Sentencing R. 97 pg. 6) 
47. Ruben Ramirez, a victim, testified on an objection from the defense counsel 
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that the Uriel Chavez-Espinoza had allegedly made some type of threat against his family. 
(Trans, of Sentencing R. 97 pg. 7) 
48. After the prosecutor, Mr. Low, raised issues concerning the sentencing matrix, 
the Court asked defense counsel whether Adult Parole and Probations should re-examine 
the recommendation in light of what was heard by the Court at the hearing. (Trans, of 
Sentencing R. 97 pg. 20) 
49. Trial counsel for the Appellant indicated that they could proceed with the 
sentencing and did not move for a continuance. (Trans, of Sentencing R. 97 pg. 20) 
50. The Prosecutor, during his arguments, indicated as follows: 
MR LOW: Mr. Chavez denies being involved in any gang activity 
or being involved in a gang, and yet he himself admits that he was with 
known gang members. He admits that in the PSI, and there's no doubting 
that that member- or that individual is a member of the Sureno 13 gang. 
He's got it written all over him. We know who he is. We know who the 
Sureno 13 gang is. 
Our drug task force, which has within the last six months been 
authorized by all jurisdictions who form that task force to go into gangs as 
well - gang enforcement - is very familiar with the Sureno 13 gang. 
I should tell the Court that Mr. Chavez is not the only member of 
his family involved in that gang. Another family member, Egdar Chavez, 
has been recently convicted for drug activity - distribution of drugs - and 
has been committed to jail. I don't know if he's been deported yet or not 
or if he's still in our jail. (Transcript of Sentencing R. 97 pg. 22) 
Another family member was involved. I don't know if the Court 
remembers the drive-by shooting that you sentenced someone to jail on, 
Raphaelio Alvarado. That is not a family member, but the victim in that 
case is a family member. He was a juvenile. He was a juvenile who 
himself was arrested and has been - has spent a substantial amount of time 
in detention for his own gang involvement. (Trans, of Sentencing R. 97 
Pg- 23) 
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51. At this point in the sentencing, Attorney Poston objected to the 
characterization which the Court overruled. (Trans, of Sentencing R. 97 pg. 23) 
52. In the objection the Prosecutor stated as follows: 
MR. LOW: This particular gang - the Sureno 14 gang that you have 
tattooed in front you there is a very dangerous gang. It is a gang that takes 
enforcement very, very seriously. In fact, when I became aware that this 
was a case involving that gang, I knew that here would be a great difficulty 
in maintaining victim cooperation throughout the trial. Every time it didn't 
happen or every continuance - and the Court heard me object to a 
continuance request because every week that passed was more fear that was 
being put into that family. (Trans, of Sentencing R. 97 pg. 24) 
53. The Court then sentenced the Appellant stating as follows: 
Therefore, the maximum sentences that my be imposed today on 
the First Degree felony is an indeterminate term of not less than nine 
years and which may be for life. As to the Second Degree felony, and 
indeterminate term of not less that one year, and which may not exceed 
15 years. For each Class A misdemeanor 365 days in the Wasatch 
County Jail. (Trans, of Sentencing R. 97 pg. 36-37) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The conviction of the Appellant should be reversed and remanded for a new trial 
because the conduct of Mr. Chavez-Espinoza does not in any manner justify the harsh and 
excessive sentence. A review the recommendation of the Pre-sentence Report on file will 
indicate that the experts at Adult Parole and Probation recommended probation as the 
appropriate sentence, despite the possible Nine to life sentence. The Aggravated Burglary 
charge should never have been submitted to the jury and when submitted it was given 
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pursuant to improper jury instructions which never defined specific intent. Instruction 
No. 33 (see Addendum to Brief, pg.13) misstates Utah law in several aspects. First by 
indicating that the jury could find the Appellant guilty but failed to direct the verdict to 
the critical element of mens rea. Secondly, by failing to define the target offense and 
specific intent. The jury instructions error must be found to be prejudicial and harmful to 
fair trial rights based upon the Enhanced First Degree Felony Conviction. Even though 
there was no proof that Mr. Chavez-Espinoza went to the apartment with the intent of 
entering to commit an assault, the jury verdict is in error because the jury was not directed 
to focus on the specific intent of the Appellant and the facts concerning entry with the 
intent to commit an assault. 
Further, trial counsel was unprepared and on the record admitted he had not talked 
to or discussed the matter with Mr. Chavez-Espinoza. The approach indicated that 
counsel did not develop a defense to the Aggravated Burglary charges. This was a 
situation where Mr. Uriel Chavez-Espinoza acknowledged that he had gone to the 
apartment and that he was involved in an assault. Trial counsel focused on minor matters 
of impeachment because there was no direction or strategy to the trial based upon the fact 
that counsel had not met with the Appellant prior to trial. The trial was also complicated 
by material, evidentiary errors which allowed the jury to consider death threats and gang 
references which were not properly before the jury. Therefore, the conviction should be 
reversed for a new trial or the gang enhancement vacated. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY AS TO COUNT 7 IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE AGGRAVATED BURGLARY CONVICTION AND A NEW TRIAL 
SHOULD BE ORDERED. 
A review of the record marshaled in the Addendum (pg. 37) will indicate that the 
evidence as to entry into the premises was provided substantially by Rosa Solis, the 
girlfriend of Jorge Ramirez. This crucial witness testified that she lived in Todd Hollow 
Apertment complex in building No. 15 and that Jorge was with her that night until the 
Appellant called at about 3:30 a.m. ( Vol. II, pg 169) Rosa Solis testified that she went to 
the other apartment unit and she was standing near the edge of the couch in the apartment 
when Uriel came into the apartment and "took a swing" at her and that she fell over the 
back of the couch. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 174) 
The witness further indicated that while she was at the Park City clinic on the 
morning of January 1, 2006 she received a telephone call from Mr. Chavez-Espinoza and 
that Uriel told her to tell Jorge that if he liked the present he had left for him that she 
would be the next one; and she then handed the telephone to Deputy Travus Jensen. (Vol. 
II, pg 177) Rosa Solis claimed on cross-examination that at the time of the assault she 
observed Fiorina in the doorway of the apartment and she did not know how Uriel came 
around her, but he would have had to go by Fiorina to enter the apartment. (Trans, of 
Trial: Vol. II, pg 181) When asked if she thought Uriel was coming after her, Rosa 
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indicated, "No he was probably looking for Adrian". (Vol. II, pg 182) 
The Verdict as to Count Seven involving Rosa Solis was Not Guilty (See Verdict 
form set forth in Addendum, pg 01) This verdict is factually and legally inconsistent with 
the Aggravated Burglary count and creates a factual inconsistency. The jury found no 
assault took place inside the apartment on this victim. The inconsistency of the Verdict is 
material because if the witness who testified that she was assaulted inside the residence 
specifically by Mr. Chavez Espinoza was found by the jury not to have been assaulted 
inside the residence, the jury should have also concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence to find the Appellant guilty of the Aggravated Burglary. 
Thus conviction on the Aggravated Burglary was based entirely on other 
circumstantial evidence, such evidence is sufficient if it is of such quality and quantity as 
to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Nickles, 728 
P.2d 123, (Utah 1986) Since, the jury found the Appellant Not Guilty of the Rosa Solis 
assault, there is no quality or quantity of sufficient, direct evidence that Mr. Chavez-
Espinoza entered into the residence with intent to assault. The Appellant submits that the 
i 
basis for the Aggravated Burglary conviction was the confusion caused by the jury 
I 
instructions on vicarious responsibility combined with gang enhancement as set forth in 
Point II of this Brief. From the opening statement of the Prosecutor, the case was 
presented to the jury focused on accomplice conduct of the conduct of third parties to 
prove the Appellant's culpability and this error requires a new trial. 
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The factual inconsistency is apparent in a review of the entire record as set forth in 
the Addendum's detailed statement of facts which have been marshaled by the Appellant 
in an attempt to show the weakness of all of the relevant facts on points used to enhance 
the verdict. The facts show a melee that took place in the hallway and fighting. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the evidence supports only a finding that 
he arrived at the apartment to talk and knocked on the door. Thereafter, there was loud 
arguing and a fight commenced in the hallway. One of the persons there that night, La 
Borrega, may have grabbed another person from the apartment, this does not show any 
specific intent by Mr. Chavez-Espinoza to enter to commit an assault. One of the 
witnesses claimed that after the fight there was a hole in the wall of the apartment, even 
though he did not see how the hole in the wall was created. Most witnesses indicated that 
the fight took place outside of the apartment in the hallway and possibly in the parking lot 
of the Todd Hollow apartment complex. The inherent inconsistency requires a new trial 
and the Court should consider this issue as to all points set forth in this Brief. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF A FIRST DEGREE FELONY WAS BASED 
UPON JURY INSTRUCTIONS THAT DID NOT ADEQUATELY DEFINE THE 
FIRST DEGREE FELONY OFFENSE AND FAILED TO INSTRUCT OF SPECIFIC 
INTENT. 
A jury instruction, such as the elements instruction at issue here, to which a party 
failed to object at trial will be reviewed upon a showing of manifest injustice based upon 
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improper and incomplete instructions. State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352 (Utah Ct.App. 1995), 
cert, denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996); and, State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, (Utah Ct.App. 
1991), affd, 900 P.2d 1093 (Utah 1995). In Perdue, the Court said that failure to give an 
elements instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard under Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 19(c) and constitutes reversible error as a matter of law. Further, 
because "the general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense 
is essential." State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) In State v. 
Stringham, 957 P.2d 602 (Utah App. 04/23/1998), where a Communications Fraud 
conviction was set aside for failure to prove the mens rea set forth in the statute. The 
Appellant submits that the error here is of that same magnitude. 
As to prejudice and unfair trial errors, an objective analysis will show that the 
i 
improper instructions increased the severity of the Appellant's conduct three times. First, 
from a situation involving a simple assault, which the Appellant had acknowledged, to 
Felony Burglary (primarily based on the inconsistent evidence that the fight in the hallway 
took place after an intentional entry). This was based upon evidence from Rosa Solis (see 
Point I of this Brief) and uncertain evidence concerning a possible entry to cause a hole in 
the livingroom wall. Next, the charges were elevated from Burglary to an Aggravated 
Burglary based upon and alleged possession of a weapon by a party. Finally, the already 
harsh sentence was enhanced based upon the involvement of multiple persons to an increased 
sentence to the First Degree felony of an indeterminate term of not less than nine years to life 
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as a result of the "gang" enhancement. Essentially, there was a double bump up for 
accomplice liability and a lack of focus on the Defendant's actual conduct and intent. 
During the opening statement, the Prosecutor improperly stated as follows: 
MR LOW: "Why is this? Well, if s called party liability. What you need to 
listen to throughout this trial is the evidence will show what did Uriel, what 
did he know, what did he want to have happen, because you know what 
sometimes? The getaway driver can be as guilty as the bank robber. 
Sometimes a person who hires a hit-man is as guilty as the hit-man. Right, we 
all know that. So what you need to do is listen to the evidence to decide, Is 
Uriel guilty not only for what he did, but also for what the others did? And I 
will ask you to find that he is. That he did this in group. They knew what was 
going on. They went there with a plan and they made it happen." (Trans, of 
Trial: Vol. I; pg 165, lines 8-18) 
The Appellant's trial counsel failed to object at this time to this manifest error which 
became the central theme of the prosecution's presentation. There was no evidence here of 
any alleged co-conspirators or any of the third parties that were with the Appellant at the 
front door to prove any conspiracy or "plan". More importantly, Counsel failed to submit 
proper jury instructions and the Court failed to provide an adequate charge to the jury. The 
remarks in the opening statement were never clarified to the jury by trial counsel through 
instructions or during his closing arguments. The central theme of the prosecutor from this 
point forward was that the group of individuals had a plan and therefore the intent of one of 
the individuals became the intent of the Appellant. Therefore, this error is manifest error or 
in the alternative is reversible under ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The elements of the base crime of Burglary are: (1) the act of entering the building, 
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with (2) the specific intent to commit a target offense of felony, theft, or other enumerated 
crime therein. State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981). "The act of entering alone does 
not give rise to an inference that the actor entered with the requisite intent to constitute 
burglary.11 Brooks at 881. The specific intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault must be 
proved, or circumstances shown from which the intent may reasonably be inferred. It is the 
intent to commit the specific crime, and not the actual crime, which is material. Brooks, 631 
P.2d at 881. In State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), the Court indicated that "In 
the future, trial courts should define the term 'specific intent5 for the jury, if that term is used; 
and if it is, it should be expressly defined in terms of the specific mental state required."1 The 
trial court failed to follow this precedent and the error resulted in an excessive sentence. 
However, the jury instructions here never define any specific intent requirements. 
Instead, the Court used only generic, non-pinpointed, statutory language in the elements 
instruction on the critical element of intent. See Instruction 26 as to Aggravated Burglary 
(see Addendum pg 10) which fails to refer to specific intent and sets forth, as far as mental 
!CALJIC No. 2.02 "The specific intent with which an act is done may be shown by the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the act. However, you may not find the defendant 
guilty of the crime charged in Counts 1, 2 or 3, namely, conspiracy to commit murder, attempted 
murder or burglary, or find the . . . gang allegation to be true, unless the proved circumstances are 
not only (1) consistent with the theory that the defendant had the required specific intent but (2) 
cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. Also, if the evidence as to any specific 
intent permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the existence of the specific 
intent and the other to its absence, you must adopt that interpretation which points to its absence. If, 
on the other hand, one interpretation of the evidence as to the specific intent appears to you to be 
reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable 
interpretation and reject the unreasonable. People v. Hughes, 27 Cal.4th 287, 39 P.3d 432 (Cal. 
2002) 
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state, the generic language "with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault on any 
person". This Instruction is in error because the Court failed to delete the theft language and 
failed to delete the overbroad phrase concerning committing a felony. This is clearly the 
responsibility of the trial judge to pinpoint and remove unnecessary language and apply the 
general law to the specific case in the charge to the jury. This is a prejudicial and material 
error because the term "felony" opens up the entire array of offenses in the criminal code. 
It is a very simple matter for the trial judge to remove extraneous language and to design 
instructions on elements in light of the facts at trial. 
Further, the Court must require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that there 
was specific intent to commit the target offense. As is traditionally required in Utah felony 
trials since the State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988) decision, there should be a 
separate instruction or language in the elements requiring that the jury must find that the 
Defendant had, at the time of acting, the specific intent to enter a dwelling for the purpose 
of committing an assault on a specific person in the residence. There should have also been 
an instruction that any reasonable hypothesis or an intent merely to discuss a problem and not 
an assault would be sufficient to convict on Burglary. (See CALJIC No. 2.02) 
Instruction 26 then goes on in paragraph Three, the third element, to cause confusion 
by indicating that the jury is to consider "the Defendant as a party to the offence". This is 
improper because the jury is not limited from using reverse logic to use the gang enactment 
or conduct of other parties to transfer the intent of third parties to prove elements as to the 
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Appellant and his mental state. Instruction 26 in paragraph Eight again uses the phrase "or 
another participant in the crime" and "caused bodily injury" to any person without adequate 
definition. 
In State v. Casonguay, 663 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1983) this Court stated that the act of 
entry in itself does not raise the presumption that it was done with the specific intent required 
to prove the offense. The Court stated, "All the circumstances, when taken together, must 
admit of no other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt to warrant conviction." In 
Castonguay, the defendant was convicted of attempted First Degree murder and that 
conviction was set aside. There, the State proved that the defendant fired his rifle, but there 
was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence of the necessary intent to kill anyone. Also, 
see Cooper v. People, 973 P.2d 1234,1240 (Colo. 1999) (holding that the crime of burglary 
requires that the person have "intended to commit a crime inside at the moment he first 
became a trespasser".) 
Instruction No, 33 (see Addendum pg. 13) misstates Utah law by indicating that the 
jury could find the Appellant guilty of "acting in concert with two or more persons" but 
failed to direct the verdict tho the critical element of mens rea. In State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 
191 (Utah 2001), the Utah Supreme Court clarified that in order for the group crime 
enhancement to apply, section 76-3-203. l(l)(a) requires a finding, based on proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, "that all three actors .. .possessed a mental state sufficient to commit the 
same underlying offense and . . . directly committed the underlying offense or solicited, 
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requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided on of the other two actors to 
engage in conduct constitution the underlying offense." Lopes, held that due process requires 
that the prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This instruction does not cover all of the elements and therefore any gang enhancement of 
the conviction must be vacated. 
In this matter, Mr. Chavez-Espinoza contests this issue under either the plain error 
doctrine or ineffective counsel. First, the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct 
the jury accurately on the elements of the offence and in lesser included offenses. The 
Appellant submits that such error was obvious and prejudicially resulted in a First Degree 
Felony conviction. As in State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201 (2005), there was no 
conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions in failing to request appropriate instructions 
and bifurcating the gang enhancement phase. State v. Clark, 89 P.3d 162 (Utah 2002). 
The next instruction, Instruction No. 34 (see Addendum, pg. 14) also defines "in 
concert with two or more persons." Instruction No. 34 gives reference to the jury of section 
numbers which are meaningless and states that, "other persons's participating as parties may 
not have the intent to engage in the same offence or degree of offence as the Defendant". 
While this reference is set forth in the statute, this section negates a finding of intent read in 
light of the skeleton instructions as set forth in Instruction No. 33 and 26. As a whole, the 
charge presents to the jury the option of convicting the Appellant as if he was present with 
other parties who may have intended to enter the residence to commit an assault or carry a 
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knife, merely because of association. Therefore, the enhancement languages are inconsistent 
with the substantive offence statute of Burglary, especially in light of the fact that there is no 
enhancement instruction, just a reference in the Verdict form. 
The inadequate instructions are also evident in Instruction No. 35 (see Addendum, 
pg. 18). That incomplete instruction is confusing in light of the evidence that other parties 
and weapons and it is also is an error when the instructions are read in the entire context and 
again lacks instructions as to proper intent. 
Missing in the key instructions, which are all set forth in the Addendum, is a specific 
instruction concerning the necessary elements of enhancement. The Court only referred in 
a definitional instruction, Instruction No. 34, Paragraph Eight, to the language "in concert 
with two or more persons". There is no other instructions to the jury setting forth the 
elements as to enhancement until the Verdict form. These Instructions are confusing and 
trial counsel for the Appellant should have objected to the instructions. The Instructions as 
a whole - when read in context do not comply with the Utah Supreme Court decisions which 
require, in order for a group enhancement to apply, that there is a finding based upon proof, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that all three of the actor possessed the mental intent sufficient 
to commit the target offence. 
Trial counsel had an obligation to focus on the defense that the Appellant never had 
any specific intent to fight when he went to the apartment and never committed a First 
Degree Felony conviction. There are no requested Instructions on this issue. This is very 
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material because the Appellant would have been subject to only a Class A or B misdemeanor 
or, at most, a Third Degree Assault conviction and not subject to life imprisonment for the 
enhanced, aggravated Burglary. 
In People v. Failla 64 Cal.2d 560 (1966), the California Supreme Court 
discussed the general law concerning jury instructions involving target offenses in 
Burglary offenses. In that decision the California Appellate Court held: 
M[W]here the evidence permits an inference that the defendant at the time 
of entry intended to commit one or more felonies and also an inference that 
his intent was merely to commit one or more misdemeanors or acts not 
punishable as crimes, the court must define 'felony1 and must instruct the 
jury which acts, among those which the jury could infer the defendant 
intended to commit, amount to felonies. Failure to do so is error, for it 
allows the triers of fact to indulge in unguided speculation as to what kinds 
of criminal conduct are serious enough to warrant punishment as felonies 
and incorporation into the burglary statute." 
In People v. Hughes, 27 Cal.4th 287, 39 P.3d 432, 27 Cal.4th 825, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 
401 (Cal. 2002), the Court stated: 
The duty to define such so-called target offenses and instruct on their 
elements has become well established. See People v. Williams (1975) 13 
Cal.3d559, 563; People v.May (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 129 (May); 
People v. Smith (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 698, 708-711.) Indeed, at the time of 
trial, the Use Note to CALJIC No. 14.50 - then the standard instruction for 
burglary - admonished: "If the defendant is charged with entering to commit 
a felony other than theft," as was the present defendant, "the felony must be 
named in the instruction and instructions defining such crime must be 
given." (Use Note to CALJIC No. 14.50 (5th ed. 1988) p. 170.) We recently 
reaffirmed this understanding of Failla in a related context: "In Failla,.. . 
we held that when a defendant is charged with burglary, the trial court, on 
its own initiative, must give instructions to the jury identifying and defining 
the target offense(s) that the defendant allegedly intended to commit upon 
entry into the building." (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 268, 
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italics in original.) 
Here, the question of defendants intent when he entered the apartment is 
unclear. There were no pre- or post-offense declarations of intent, and there 
was no evidence at the scene to suggest that a completed rape ever 
occurred. And yet the condition of the victim's body and the partial removal 
of her clothing would have suggested to a reasonable juror that some kind 
of sexual intent was in defendant's mind when he entered the apartment. As 
defendant observes, however, "sexual intent" - even if it consisted of an 
intent to commit some kind of sexual assault or some other 
"undifferentiated sexual misbehavior" (Failla, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 565-
566) - is not the same thing as intent to commit rape. 
Further, this is a critical issue facing the Courts in the State of Utah in light of the 
increasing number of domestic situations in which persons may become involved in 
disagreements which lead to assaultive behavior at residences. In this situation before the 
Court, Mr. Chavez-Espinoza was a relative and a friend of many of the persons who 
testified against him and who lived at the Todd Hollow apartment complex. The 
I 
evidence shows that after the incident of January 1, 2006, the Appellant and the witnesses 
attended social events and were seen socializing together. The Appellant was not a third 
party or stranger. The burglary statute has been expanded to include assaults and 
therefore domestic assault situations, the statute is frequently mover charged in similar 
situations where a co-habitant goes to a residence in which they have lived with the 
intention of confronting another person, but without the intent to commit an assault. 
When an assault takes place instead of being charged with a Class B misdemeanor a 
person can be charged with a First or Second Degree felony. The enhancement of 
misdemeanor conduct to felony conduct is a problem which occurs if the offences are not 
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carefully defined in situations where a person goes to a residence and a fight later occurs. 
The Appellant submits that the totality of the jury instructions were either improper 
or trial counsel should not have allowed the issue of gang enhancement to be submitted at 
the same time as the issue of accomplice liability to the underlying charges. Prior to 
opening arguments, the Court gave the option to counsel to have the jury retire to 
deliberate the question of guilt and innocence as to the charged counts and then after a 
verdict was reached to retire again and deliberate the question of whether or not the 
Appellant acted in concert with two or more people. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. I, pg 135) 
Trial counsel for the Appellant stipulated that the jury would not need to be bifurcated 
which resulted one deliberation, rather than two deliberations. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. I, pg 
153) Counsel should not have agreed to this procedure which caused an improper verdict. 
The Instructions are in error on defining the elements of several offenses and in error of 
failing to adequately instruct on the enhancement. Therefore, the Appellant requests a new 
trial with pinpointed instructions on all of the key issues and the full range of offenses. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY WAS NOT PREPARED FOR TRIAL 
AND DID NOT MEET THE STANDARDS REQUIRED FOR EFFECTIVE 
COUNSEL 
On the day of the trial, trial counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Scott Poston, reiterated the 
Motion to Continue which he had filed requesting a continuance of the trial one week earlier. 
The Motion was based upon the fact that Attorney Poston acknowledged that he did not have 
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an opportunity to adequately discuss and prepare for the case because he had not been in 
contact with his client. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. I, pg 7) (See Affidavits in the Addendum, pg. 
26-34.) 
Thus, the trial commenced with the acknowledgment from Mr. Poston that he needed 
additional time to prepare and had not been sufficiently in contact with the Appellant. The 
Court transferred this error by trial counsel to the shoulders of the Appellant by denying the 
Motion and indicating that the Appellant should have kept in contact with his counsel, 
however there was never any adequate discussion concerning the reasons why there had not 
been sufficient contact and the issue of unpaid attorney's fees was never explored. 
The Court ruled that the Appellant had a period of time to keep in contact with his 
counsel and there was no evidence that Mr. Chavez-Espinoza was unable to make contact 
with his retained counsel. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. I, pg 7) The trial court indicated that the 
trial had been set since May 10, 2006 and the Motion to Continue was not filed until one 
week before the trial was to commence. Based upon that and the Court's indication that the 
victims had a right to a speedy trial, the Court denied the continuance. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. 
I, pg 8) Counsel filed no request for jury instructions which in this case is a per se error. 
The next problem with representation occurs after the jury was given general vor dire 
questions when a juror, Mr. Lowell, raised the issue regarding the fairness of the jury panel 
and the Trial court indicated that trial counsel had an opportunity to challenge the panel and 
"they elected not to do that". (See Point VII of this Brief.) 
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In State v. Malaga, 132 P.3d 703, 2006 UT App 103 (Utah App. 2006), the Court 
stated: 
We will, however, examine Defendant's claims of structural and trial errors 
in the jury instructions under the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. 
"Where, as here, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the 
first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a question 
of law." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "To prevail 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Defendant] must show that 
(1) trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) there exists 
a reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, the outcome would 
likely have been more favorable to [Defendant]." State v. Mecham, 2000 UT 
App 247,f21, 9 P.3d 777. (Utah 2000) 
As set forth throughout this Brief and in the Addendum, trial counsel committed 
numerous errors on key issues. This resulted from not being prepared for trial and not 
interviewing the witnesses until they agreed to testify. Failing to request jury instructions 
standing alone, is material error which lead to the First Degree Felony conviction. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE FIRST DEGREE FELONY TO BE 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS. 
After some discussions off the record, the jury was called back into the jury room. 
At that time, trial counsel made a motion for directed verdict as to Count One, Two, and Four 
based upon the fact that there was no intent to commit a felony or a theft. (Transcript of 
Trial: Volume III, pg 64) The Court took the motion for directed verdict under advisement 
and denied the Motion. 
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At that time in the trial, the Court should have carefully reviewed the issues of 
vicarious liability in light of the gang enhancement and the evidence. The trial court, prior 
to instructing the jury, had the ability to clarify the case by dismissing the gang enhancement 
and dismissing the Aggravated Burglary charge. The Court erred in not submitting the 
matter as a Second Degree Burglary. At that stage in the proceedings, as more fully set forth 
in the Addendum, the evidence shows there was no sufficient evidence of the Appellant's 
specific intent to enter into the residence. In addition, the trial court should have seen that 
after the fight started the other individuals, some of whom were at the Todd Hollow 
apartments because they lived there an became involved in a fight and melee. Thereafter, it 
is not uncommon for two persons fighting to resort to the use of a weapon. The evidence 
here was that the Defendant, La Borrega, did pull a knife and also had a deep wound on his 
hand caused by the person he was fighting, who also used a weapon/knife. The entire factual 
scenario here should have been determined by the Court in the context of all of the evidence 
not to have warranted a submission to the jury on the Aggravated Burglary count or the gang 
enhancement count. Therefore, the conviction should be reversed or a new trial should be 
granted. In the alternative, this Court should reduce the conviction to a Second Degree 
Felony or Class A misdemeanor. 
POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A VERDICT OF A FIRST 
DEGREE FELONY. 
Counsel on appeal has detailed all of the relevant facts and evidence concerning the 
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insufficiency of the objective evidence as to the charge of Aggravated Burglary enhanced for 
gang involvement. (See Addendum, pg 37-60) The Appellant respectfully submits that if 
trial counsel had effectively prepared for trial and had designed effective pretrial motions and 
jury instructions, that the result would not have been to one of the most serious criminal 
offences under Utah Law. 
This point is directed to Count I and the lack of evidence sufficient to raise this Count 
to the most serious felony level based upon the technical "entry". The conviction should be 
reversed because of the failure to prove a First Degree Felony. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING JURORS FOR CAUSE OVER OBJECTION OF 
TRIAL COUNSEL AND IN GRANTING OBJECTION BY THE STATE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted, however, that the exercise of the trial court's 
discretion in selecting a fair and impartial jury must be viewed "in light of the fact that it is 
a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and 
selecting another." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981) 
The State objected for cause to Juror No. 3, Jayme Thurman, based upon the fact that 
she had young children and the fact that she had an uncle and a friend who she believed were 
wrongfully convicted. (Trans. ofTrial: Vol.1, pg 130) Defense counsel objected to excusing 
the witness for cause based upon the fact that when Ms. Thurman was examined by the Judge 
she indicated that she would be able to make an impartial judgement. The trial Judge 
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overruled the objection finding that the child care issues would justify a challenge for cause 
where she was internally conflicted in light of her experience and ongoing doubts concerning 
the justice system and granted the State's Motion for Cause. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. I, pg 132) 
After both of the parties had made the challenges for cause, the Court, on its own 
motion indicated that the trial judge would strike from the jury panel Juror No. 28, Ms. 
Ashby, because she had a nephew who was in prison for homicide. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. I, 
pg 136) The Court stated that when answering questions regarding whether or not she could 
be fair and impartial, Ms. Ashby answered that she thought she could. The Court indicated 
that it was clear to the Judge that she was emotional about the issue and was, in his view, 
"internally conflicted". The Court found that she should be removed from the panel over an 
objection of the trial counsel and struck Ms. Ashby for cause. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. I, pg 
138) (See Jury List set forth in Addendum, pg 19.) 
The trial court committed plain error by denying Appellant's equivocal challenge of 
Juror 10 for cause, and by failing to sua sponte remove Juror 10 for cause. To prevail, 
Appellant must show that the trial court committed an obvious error, and that such error was 
prejudicial. The trial court committed error if it abuses its discretion by acting beyond the 
limits of reasonability. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992). An error is 
harmful if absent the error "there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the defendant." Larsen, 2005 UT App 201. 
The Appellant submits that there were prejudicial errors in striking persons from 
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the jury. This further denied the Appellant his right to a fair trial and restricted the entire 
process of jury selection. The cumulative effect of the exclusion further denied him a 
right to trial. 
POINT VII 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR JURY PANEL CONTAINING 
HISPANIC PERSONS. 
A review of the record will indicate that this was a matter in which extra interpreters 
were required because the witnesses, as well as Mr. Chavez-Espinoza, were of Hispanic 
origin and the extra interpreters were required to translate the Spanish language. A further 
review will also indicate that the cultural differences were noted by the Prosecutor when he 
stated as follows in his opening argument: 
[MR. LOW]: "this is a culture we are not used to seeing everyday" and no objection 
was made by defense counsel. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. I, pg 159) 
Ironically, it was a non-Hispanic citizen and member of the jury who made the 
following statement in chambers: 
[MR. LOWELL]: "I am curious if the Defendant is Hispanic. How 
come we aren't more Hispanic in the jury pool? I mean, it is a fairly large 
population in this town and they all have Driver's Licences and I am 
concerned that he is not represented." (Trans, of Trial: Vol. I; pg 105, lines 
21-25) 
The record also reflects that trial counsel made a last minute Motion to Continue 
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indicating that he was not prepared to go to trial and had not engaged in sufficient 
communication with Uriel Chavez-Espinoza. It is reasonable to infer from the Motion to 
Continue that trial counsel also was negligent and should have filed a Motion that would 
have resulted in a procedure in which there would have been at least one Hispanic person 
selected for the jury panel. The venire of the jury indicates that there was one Hispanic 
surname on the jury panel, but that person did not appear on the day of trial. (Addendum, 
pg. 19) 
Under the Federal and State Constitution, an accused is entitled to a jury drawn from 
a representative cross-section of the community. United States Constitution, 6th 
Amendment; Duren v. Missouri 439 U.S. 357, 358-367 (1979) People v. Howard 1 Cal. 4th 
1132, 824 P.2d 1315 (1992). That guarantee mandates that the pools from which juries are 
drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. In People v. 
Mattson, 50 Cal.3d 826, (1990), the California Courts stated: 
"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section 
requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded 
is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this 
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in 
relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this 
under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-
selection process. If a defendant establishes & prima facie case of systematic 
under-representation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a 
more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity 
exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the 
disparity of the jury venire." People v. Sanders, 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 (1990). 
The fact that the jury venire as set forth on the Jury List lists no Hispanics and the fact 
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that a citizen remarked on the obvious disparity of the panel are grounds to find manifest 
error or an additional ground supporting the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A MISTRIAL BASED UPON 
STATEMENTS MADE ABOUT INADMISSIBLE DEATH THREATS HEARD BY 
THE JURY 
The principle that evidence is not admissible to show a defendant's bad character or 
propensity to commit criminal acts is a "fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence and 
has been recognized in this Court's opinions for over ninety years" State v. Doporto, 935 
P.2d 484 (Utah 1997) and, State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989). 
During the cross-examination of the Jorge Ramirez by defense counsel, Mr. Poston, 
the following exchange took place: 
Q: And then now are you back together? 
A: Yes, and we have a little girl. And I am afraid because -
Q: Sorry. I'm not asking any questions. He's just talking. 
We need to have it translated and then we'll have it stricken. 
THE REPORTER: I have from I am afraid because -
THE WITNESS: Because he has threatened my wife and we have a little 
girl and he has threatened her with her life. 
MR. POSTON: Move to strike that, your Honor. It wasn't in response 
to any question. 
THE COURT: The answer is stricken from the record. It was not 
responsive to the question that was posed. 
MR. POSTON: Are you married now? 
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[THE WITNESS] A: Yes. (Trans, of Trial: Vol. II, pg 127-128) 
Besides being stricken from the record there should have been a mistrial granted 
because even if the Court would have taken the next required step and admonished the jury 
concerning that statement, the inherent prejudice was unfair and created a presumption that 
the Appellant was a person of bad character. This was extraneous information which 
expanded liability based upon vicarious responsibility for other persons. 
POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT AS TO THE LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF TRESPASSING 
This is clearly an offense warranting an instruction on the lesser included offense 
of burglary and trespassing which is factually relevant to the conduct and states: 
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-206. Criminal trespass. 
(1) As used in this section, "enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not amounting 
to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204 or a violation 
of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any property, 
including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107; | 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of another; 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on property as 
to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with apparent 
authority to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or 
(c) he enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(7). 
In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159(Utah 1983), the Court held that if there is a 
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sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury question regarding a lesser offense, then 
the court should instruct the jury regarding the lesser offense. Under this test, a 
defendant must show (1) that the charged offense and the lesser included offense have 
overlapping statutory elements and (2) that the evidence provides a 'rational basis' for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and conceiting him of the include 
offense. Here the elements of trespass are right on point under the Defendants' theory of 
the defense. That is, Mr. Chavez Espinoza went to his cousins house to discuss a 
problem when he was intoxicated. This probably was "reckless as to whether his presence 
will cause fear for the safety of another" and may have been committed without entry if he 
went to the public area which is still part of the property. 
The jury acquitted the Appellant and found him Not Guilty of the only assault that 
allegedly took place inside the residence. In People v. Dewberry, 51 Cal.2d 548, (1959) 
the California Supreme Court held that when the evidence is sufficient to support a 
finding of guilty of both the offense and a lesser included offense, the jury must be 
instructed that if they entertain a reasonable doubt as to which offense has been 
committed, they must find the defendant guilty only of the lesser offense. When a case 
involves a lesser-included offense, such an instruction must be given sua sponte. People 
v. Crone, 54 Cal. App.4th 71 (1997). 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the Court erred in not giving the jury a 
range of related and included offenses including Burglary of a dwelling and trespass. 
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The failure to instruct denied the jury of the option of deciding on a rational basis 
whether or not the Appellant's conduct warranted a Trespass conviction. The trial Judge 
has an obligation to give a person the option of the range of offenses when the legislature 
has provided that assaultive conduct at a residence ranges form a Class B Misdemeanor 
to an enhanced First Degree Felony. 
POINT X 
THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL SHOULD 
BE REMANDED FOR FURTHER HEARING 
The Appellant submits that the Court of Appeals should reconsider the denial of 
the Motion to Remand the case for hearing in the context of the Brief of the Appellant 
and the Affidavits on file with the Court. The Court has jurisdiction to reconsider this 
matter based upon the filing of this Brief which shows in the entire context of the matter 
and the necessity of additional testimony concerning the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The Appellant respectfully requests that the Court correct the injustice which 
occurred in this matter in which an Appellant has been subjected to the sever punishment 
in excess of a First Degree felony for the conduct of third parties. There was no plan as 
alleged by the prosecutor. The Presentence Report recommended probation which 
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demonstrates the prejudice of the errors. 
As detailed in this Brief, the improper Jury Instructions coupled with the 
overlapping evidence of accomplice liability and gang enhancement denied the 
Appellant a fair trial. Mr. Chavez-Espinoza respectfully requests that the matter be 
submitted for new trial or reversal of the gang enhancement. In the alternative, the 
Appellant requests that the Court stay the proceedings and remand this matter back to the 
District Court for findings on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in this 
Brief. 
DATED this day of July, 2007. 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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